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This article aimed to provide a critical appreciation of a postfoundational practical theology 
as developed by Julian Müller and a further exploration of this approach towards a public 
Christology. The logos of Christology is crossed out, but not erased as it is not a new theory 
or system or dogma, but rather a spirituality. Such a public Christology was unpacked as a 
postmetaphysical reformed spirituality in the three publics of academia, society and church. 
Introduction
The shifts in practical theology
Practical  theology  traditionally  had  the  task  of  bringing  into  normative  or  transformative 
conversation, Christian tradition and cultural-religious experiences and practices, or Text and 
context, and over the years of practical theological theory and/or methodology various models 
for this conversation have been developed. At first it was a rather linear conversation where 
historic theology discovered the truths and systematic theology captured that truth into coherent 
dogmatic  statements  which  could  then  be  applied  to  the  context  of  practice.  Louw  (2011:1) 
argues that this historic phase of practical theological thinking was dominated ‘by the agenda of 
orthodox thinking: right and true doctrine’. The linguistic turn in philosophy, and by implication 
in the humanities, brought about a new understanding of theology and particularly of practical 
theology.
In response to the role that the cultural-social context plays in our thinking, Paul Tillich (1951:36) 
developed  the  correlational  approach,  which  understood  theology  as  a  correlation  between 
the existential questions emerging from cultural experiences and answers from the Christian 
Scriptures. David Tracy (1975:43–63) further developed Tillich’s correlational approach into what 
he termed the critical correlational approach. Tracy emphasised a mutually critical correlation 
between Scripture and the context of culturally embedded experiences. Thus, with the linguistic 
turn, cultural experience and tradition, or theory and practice, or normative Text and context, 
can no longer be seen as separated, but these previous opposites are understood to be mutually 
dependent, therefore influencing each other. After the linguistic turn, practical theology could 
no longer be seen as this linear approach of applied theology. A circular and spiral approach 
emerged, as theories are practice laden and practices are theory laden (see Browning 1991). With 
this turn, practical theology, which has as its focus this conversation between what can broadly be 
termed Text and context, moved from the margins of theology to the centre, as the hermeneutic 
reflection and conversation became the ‘essence’ of theology. Because of this hermeneutical task 
of practical theology, Browning could boldly proclaim that practical theology is fundamental 
practical theology. According to fundamental practical theology, the hermeneutic task of practical 
theology is the fundamental task of theology as such. 
Another shift took place and that is the shift out of the church and into the public sphere. 
Previously, practical theology focused on practices within the church according to the various 
sub-disciplines of practical theology and Louw (2011) refers to this as the homiletic paradigm 
and  ecclesial  paradigm.  The  ecclesial  or  homiletic  paradigm  followed  the  linear  approach 
of aligning the practices of the church to the dogmatic statements. After the linguistic turn, 
practical theology no longer focuses exclusively on the practices of the church, but investigates 
religious dimensions of various human practices. This shift has been described by some as a shift 
towards lived religion (Failing & Heimbrock 1998; Gräb 2002; Ganzevoort 2009). The shift to the 
hermeneutic understanding of theology, as well as the shift in focus to lived religion, emphasises 
the need for interdisciplinary conversations within practical theology (see Ganzevoort 2009). It 
is in the context of the linguistic turn, as well as the growing importance for interdisciplinary 
conversations, that Julian Müller’s (2004, 2011) postfoundational approach to practical theology 
offers important insights.
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Müller’s postfoundational practical 
theology 
Müller’s postfoundational approach begins with the context 
of experience and practice (church practices and experiences, 
as well as lived religion). It begins in the context of theory-
laden practices and these practices need to be understood 
and interpreted and thus the first three movements of his 
approach focus on describing and interpreting these theory-
laden  practices  through  interdisciplinary  conversations 
(Müller 2004:300). As such, the first three movements are: 
•  A specific context is described.
•  In-context experiences are listened to and described.
•  Interpretation  of  experiences  is  made,  described  and 
developed in collaboration with ‘co-researchers’. 
The  focus  is  on  existential  experiences  within  a  specific 
context. The fourth movement in Müller’s approach focuses 
on the traditions of interpretation and how these traditions 
inform  the  description  of  experiences.  Description  of 
experiences is never undertaken in a vacuum, but it is part of 
a social construct and thus there are numerous traditions that 
partake in the construction of that particular local context. 
These  traditions  inform  how  the  experiences  within  that 
context are experienced, described and therefore how they are 
interpreted. The postfoundational approach, which developed 
from the transversal rationality of Welsch and Schrag (see 
Van  Huyssteen  1997,  1998),  understands  that  no  tradition 
is foundational and that understanding and interpretation 
happens in the transversal space where traditions interweave 
and intersect. The various traditions that inform and shape 
a context are brought into consideration and therefore the 
importance of interdisciplinary conversations. 
In the fifth movement, the focus is on the presence of God, 
namely a reflection on God’s presence as it is understood and 
experienced in a specific situation (Müller 2004:300). God’s 
presence is understood within the context of the metaphors 
and  narrative  resources  of  that  particular  community’s 
reflections about the divine or sacred. God’s presence can 
be interpreted or reflected upon within the context of that 
particular  community,  that  is,  as  part  and  parcel  of  that 
particular social construction. 
Does the concept ‘God’ stand in for any divinity or divine or 
sacred story or ultimate reference, because to reflect on the 
presence of God can mean various different things depending 
on the tradition from which one views the divine or God? 
It could, for example, be what Stephen Crites (1989:69) calls 
the sacred story. Or it could refer to how sociologists such as 
McBrien (1987) describe religion: 
…  the  whole  complexus  of  attitudes,  convictions,  emotions, 
gestures,  rituals,  symbols,  beliefs,  and  institutions  by  which 
persons come to terms with, and express, their personal and/
or communal relationship with the ultimate reality (God and 
everything that pertains to God). (p. 11)
According to this thinking, God’s presence can therefore be 
interpreted as the ultimate reality or ultimate reference or 
ultimate good (Neuhaus 1984:256). Geertz (1993) describes 
religion as: 
a system of symbols which act to establish powerful, pervasive, 
and  long-lasting  moods  and  motivations  in  humanity  by 
formulating  conceptions  of  a  general  order  of  existence  and 
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that 
the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. (p. 90) 
Berger (1967:32) argues that religion forms ‘highly theoretical 
constructions by which the nomos of a society is legitimated in 
toto in which all less-than-total legitimations are theoretically 
integrated  in  an  all-embracing  Weltanschauung’.  Religion 
thus offers the ultimate founding myth or legitimisation of 
what is (ontology of a particular worldview), which brings 
it into close proximity to Benjamin’s (1996) founding myths 
that legitimise and give authority to laws and norms of a 
particular society. Religion can thus be broadly understood 
as religare – that which binds a particular worldview together 
as a whole. 
Thus,  a  reflection  on  God  or  God’s  presence  is  basically 
a  reflection  on  the  ultimate  reference,  ultimate  myth,  of 
a  particular  community.  It  is  a  reflection  on  the  ultimate 
founding myth of the particular worldview, in other words 
a  reflection  on  the  divinities  of  that  specific  Geviert  (see 
Heidegger’s fourfold, 1971:179) of a particular Dasein. In a 
postfoundationalist approach this would be the only way to 
reflect on the presence of God. If it is a Christian community, 
then the reflection on God would be a reflection on how the 
Christian metaphors and narrative resources shape and form 
the interpretation of that community’s ultimate reference or 
the founding myth of that particular Christian community 
and  thus  help  to  make  sense  of  the  specific  experiences 
within that particular context. 
What would differentiate such a reflection on the presence of 
God in Müller’s approach from the focus on God or divine 
or religion from a sociological point of view? This question 
is also raised in Louw’s (2011) article when he asks: ‘what is 
meant by the theological dimension implied in the empirical 
dimension of the praxis of practical theology?’ Or in his later 
question where he asks: ‘what is theological in the praxis 
of practical theological reflection?’ (Louw 2011:5). Van der 
Ven (2004:332) echoes this question with his argument that 
practical theology, to be theological, needs to focus on divine 
action otherwise it could just as well be in the faculty of social 
science. What would qualify as a focus on divine action? This 
question raises the question of intentionality – who is the 
intentional subject of ‘theological or religious action’? Is it 
God or humanity? It is difficult to separate these two as Van 
der Ven argues, because believing that God acts alone is a 
human construction, or a human confession (see Van der Ven 
2004:367) and confessing is a human action, thus God’s action 
cannot be neatly separated from human action. Ganzevoort 
(2009)  interprets  practical  theology  as  the  hermeneutic  of 
lived  religion  to  come  to  an  understanding  of  the  heart  of 
practical theology. It is theological because it includes in its 
focus the religious component, which Ganzevoort (2009:n.p.) 
describes  as  follows:  ‘I  would  define  religion  as  the 
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transcending patterns of action and meaning embedded in 
and contributing to the relation with the sacred.’ Concerning 
the sacred he writes, ’… the sacred at least implies that it is a 
center around which one’s life gravitates and a presence that 
evokes awe and passion’. With the term ‘lived’ he focuses 
specifically on how communities live ‘more adequately in 
relation to the sources of religious tradition and to the ideas 
about  the  divine’  (Ganzevoort  2009:n.p.),  thereby  linking 
practice to both what can be understood as textual studies 
(or the studies of sacred texts in various religious traditions) 
and systematic theology or the reflection and formulation of 
ideas about the divine or sacred. Therefore his understanding 
of practical theology does not deviate from what was argued 
in the first few paragraphs – that practical theology is the 
relationship between Text and context. What has broadened 
is that various different texts of other religions are included 
as  well.  Hermeneutics  is  interpreted  by  Ganzevoort 
(2009:n.p.)  as  understanding  lived  religion  ‘from  its  own 
characteristics and in light of its own understandings and 
intrinsic normativity’. 
Although  the  shift  to  lived  religion  and  understanding 
practical theology as a hermeneutic of lived religion broadens 
the theory-practice, or Browning’s theory-laden practices, to 
include the practices of other religions, this broadening of its 
scope does not adequately answer the question, what makes 
it  theological  rather  than  sociology  of  religion.  The  focus 
here will be on the question: what makes postfoundational 
practical theology theological, if there is not a single dominant 
tradition or foundation? It would be un-postfoundational to 
make the Christian tradition normative or foundational and 
thus it needs to remain open to other religious traditions. 
Yet  in  Ganzevoort’s  (2009)  approach,  the  sacred  texts 
and  ideas  about  the  divine  still  play  a  normative  role  in 
interpreting lived religion and therefore I would argue that 
that approach cannot be understood as postfoundational, as 
it is an interpretation within the context of that specific lived 
religion’s foundations. 
On the other hand, one could argue that if the reflection on 
God from a Christian perspective (historical theology and 
systematic theology) is not normative or guiding, what then 
distinguishes practical theology from sociology of religion? 
Before  I  focus  on  these  questions  I  will  shortly  mention 
the  last  two  movements  of  Müller’s  (2004:300)  seven 
movements  of  postfoundational  practical  theology.  The 
sixth  movement  is  a  description  of  experience,  thickened 
through interdisciplinary investigation. The last movement 
is  the  development  of  alternative  interpretations  that 
point  beyond  the  local  community.  On  what  basis  are 
alternative interpretations developed that point beyond the 
local  community?  The  alternative  interpretations  emerge 
through the interdisciplinary (thickened) descriptions. The 
question concerns the role of power in these interdisciplinary 
conversations. The powerful discourses will determine the 
alternative  interpretation,  which  will  then  be  a  normative 
interpretation  according  to  the  norms  of  the  powerful 
discourses. These alternative (normative) interpretations will 
certainly point beyond the local as they will be in harmony 
with dominant global discourses. If power is not taken into 
consideration  then  therapy  or  research  will  become  ways 
of conforming to dominant discourses, bringing the client 
(therapy) or theory (research) in line with the Big Other. To 
prevent this conforming depends on the role the Big Other 
plays in all seven movements and therefore is a question of 
theology. 
The theology of postfoundational 
practical theology
What  is  theological  about  practical  theology  from  a 
postfoundational  perspective?  Postfoundational  practical 
theology can be interpreted as being theological where God’s 
action, revealed in Christ, is the hermeneutical centre of the 
whole approach of all the movements rather than only one of 
the movements. In other words, God, as revealed in Christ, 
is not only a theme to be reflected on in one of the seven 
movements,  but  a  certain  postmetaphysical  interpretation 
of God informs the spirituality of the whole approach. A 
postmetaphysical  interpretation  of  God,  where  the  shift 
is  away  from  ‘transcending  patterns  of  action’,  has  the 
possibility of being a non-religious method to interpret and 
engage lived religion critically. 
To be able to say that and make such a strong claim, certain 
things need to be unpacked. Where would such a theology 
begin? Theology would begin where one always already is, 
namely within the context of Dasein, that is, not the context in 
general, but the particular context of a particular Dasein (being-
there-in-a-particular-world). The focus is on particular texts1 
(persons, experiences, practices, actions, phenomena) within 
their particular infinite chains of texts which forms a web of 
texts, namely a context: archi-writing. Context, understood 
as that in which text(s) are embedded, and thus the context 
shapes and co-determines the meaning, value and identity of 
the texts that find their home (habitus) with a particular web 
of texts that form the context or the archi-writing of that text. 
A text, on the other hand, is everything that can be identified, 
named, has meaning and is interpreted and, as such, it is 
writing, namely the construction of meaning through signs. 
This understanding of text and context is developed from the 
linguistic turn in the thinking of Heidegger (1971) and Derrida 
(1997). Heidegger refers to language as the house of being. 
Yet, this house of being is taken for granted and, as such, it 
is not noticed, because it is the silent speaking of language 
that is forgotten or is not heard as one’s world appears to 
one as natural or God-given. The world as it ‘is’ for me is not 
perceived as a social construction, but is perceived as the way 
it truly is in reality! It is that way because it is obvious, natural 
or God-given, one argues, finding it difficult to comprehend 
that what is, is only my or our social construction of what 
is. Yet, it is not obvious, natural or God-given, but socially 
constructed by the particular house of being, the particular 
language of my Dasein. This is the silent speaking of language 
that is concealed in the unconcealment of all experiences and 
1.I follow Ricoeur (1973:91) when using the word ‘text’ to refer to the objects of 
sociological research.Original Research
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practices,  that  the  practical  theologian  seeks  to  describe, 
understand and interpret. 
One  is  not  conscious  that  the  various  texts  (actions, 
experiences, phenomena) are embedded within a particular 
context that gives these texts meaning, value and identity, 
as it is the silent speaking of language. The silent speaking 
of  language  is  where  things  (texts)  carry  out  a  world 
(context) and world (context) grant place to things (texts) 
(see Heidegger 1971:200). In other words, things (texts) have 
meaning because they are embedded and thus find a home or 
a place within a context and it is this context that gives them 
place: meaning and identity. This mutual carrying out and 
granting place is the silent speaking of language in and out 
of  dif-ference  (Austrag)  (Heidegger  1971:200ff.).  The  silent 
and forgotten speaking of language is all there is as there is 
nothing outside text or context (see Derrida 1997:58). 
This  is  the  place  where  theology  already  is  –  the  place 
(context)  of  one’s  Dasein:  Being-there-in-the-world-with-
others, but language is the house of this being-in-the-world-
with-others. Therefore one can argue that one is in language, 
and  the  infinite  chain  of  texts  within  contexts,  informing 
and referring to each other, but never reaching that which 
is beyond text or outside of text, that is the habitus of Dasein 
and thus it is in language, the house of being, that practical 
theology already finds itself. 
If there is no way beyond text, this fundamentally wounds all 
metaphysics, or said differently, it inscribes all metaphysics 
within  text  and  there  is  no  beyond  inscription.  Therefore 
one  can  speak  of  a  postmetaphysical  approach.  Theo-logy 
is one such inscription if it is understood as an attempt to 
understand or think or talk (logos) about God (theos), unless 
God is interpreted (inscribed) differently. 
The  tradition  known  as  negative  theology  realises  that  it 
is impossible to talk of God and therefore they realise the 
impossibility  of  theo-logy.  It  is  this  tradition  that  Derrida 
engages  to  understand  the  proximity  and  difference  of 
différance  to  negative  theology  (see  Derrida  1995,  2008; 
Meylahn 2013b:226ff.). 
The  impossibility  of  speaking  of  God  in  the  negative 
theological  tradition  is  similar  to  the  impossibility  of 
speaking conclusively about anything, because everything 
is  in  language  and  therefore  characterised  by  différance. 
Therefore, the negative theological impossibility of saying 
anything  definitive  and  conclusive  about  God  is  true  for 
everything, as Derrida says ‘every other is wholly other (tout 
autre est tout autre)’ (Derrida 1995:74). One is always already 
in  language  and  any  attempt  to  get  beyond  language  is 
impossible. All that such an attempt to get beyond language 
(outside  the  text)  achieves  is  the  discovery  of  an  infinite 
referential chain of signifiers. This infinite referential chain can 
also be referred to as the infinite desertification of language, 
which Derrida, in reference to the God of negative theology, 
argues is a good name for saving God (Derrida 1995:56). It is 
not only a good name for God, thereby saving the name God, 
but it also keeps God’s name safe from idolatry. As God is 
a name worth saving and by saving it, as the name for this 
infinite desertification, God is saved from the idolatry of the 
names and concepts of God (see Derrida 1995).
Negative  theology  reveals  something  of  the  essence  of 
language,  namely  prayer.  Just  as  the  prayer  of  negative 
theology is a way to cross the desert, the abyss, as it is a 
response to the call of the Other in the address to the Other, 
so  is  language  an  attempt  to  cross  the  abyss  (the  endless 
desertification  of  language)  in  response  to  the  call  of  an 
other as an address to an other. Prayer is language and thus 
one can follow Caputo (2006) in his idea of theology of the 
event as an inner textual event. Theology, as theology of the 
event, is something that happens in texts and between texts 
as a prayer for the coming of the other, which is another way 
of speaking of auto-deconstruction: that which breaks texts 
open for what is still to come – a certain messianism without 
messiah (Derrida 2002).
The  danger  in  Caputo’s  interpretation  of  Derrida  is  that 
différance can then become one more philosophy (or in this 
case theology) of difference, as Laruelle accuses Derrida of 
(see Laruelle 2010). In other words, that this theology of the 
event develops a kind of philosophy of difference between 
text and ’reality’, even if that correlation is a correlation of 
non-relation relation or a relation of difference (see Meylahn 
2013a). 
Even thinking God as event, (Caputo 2006) or as the God 
who may be (Kearney 2001), could lead to a philosophy of 
difference as it is still a construction of the Other. It is for this 
reason that I would like to move beyond seeking to know 
God or to know the other who is every other. One cannot 
know God! God is beyond knowing, but so is every other. 
All we have is text (Derrida 1997:58). Laruelle (1999, 2001, 
2003) radicalises this statement of Derrida by arguing that 
all we have is a vision-in-One. It is this vision-in-One that is 
the focus of practical theology as practical theology focuses 
on what is at hand (what one has access to): the practices and 
daily experiences. That is all one has: all there is, is text and 
no outside text. 
There are two good theological reasons to have this focus 
on the vision-in-One rather than seeking various theologies 
of the Other. The first is a biblical text that invites believers 
to have this focus rather than seeking to know the Other, 
namely John 14:7. The other is from the protestant tradition 
and  Luther,  following  Paul  with  regards  to  not  knowing 
anything but Christ crucified (1 Cor 2:2), who had very strong 
words for any theologian that sought to seek God outside of 
Christ crucified.2 
If God is sought elsewhere than in the cross that theology 
becomes a theologia gloriae. Theologia gloriae, in the context of 
the above, can be described as religion or the sacred canopy 
of  our  world-creation:  that  is,  an  idol  –  a  human  social 
2.See Theological Theses 18–25, and their corresponding Proofs, within ‘The Heidelberg 
disputation’ (Luther 1518).Original Research
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construction.  Any  other  theology,  but  theologia  Crucis,  is 
idolatry and therefore the shift from theology to Christology, 
but where the logos is crossed out – not erased, but crucified, 
so  as  not  to  become  an  idolatry  in  itself.  Crossed  out 
(crucified) so as to not become a way of seeing or thinking 
or understanding, as that would lead to work-righteousness 
and vainglory. A logos would be a work-righteousness and 
therefore  the  logos  needs  to  be  crucified  so  as  to  remain 
utterly dependent on text (scripture), Christ, faith and grace 
alone. 
Is there a God beyond these human constructions? This is 
something one cannot conclusively argue for or against, as 
whatever argument one would propose would again only be 
a text: construction or idol, that is to say, a particular and 
therefore a context dependent theologia gloriae. One cannot 
conclusively argue for either atheism or theism as both are 
social-constructions  and  in  that  sense  theologia  gloriae  or 
a-theologia gloriae. 
Therefore, the focus should rather be with the One or Vision-
in-One as revealed in the narratives of Jesus. Focus on the 
incarnation and immanence, rather than on the impossibility 
of access or knowledge of transcendence or the Transcendent. 
Therefore the focus will not be on the Other that breaks into 
texts, as there is not much point in speculation about the 
other, but the focus will be on the Other made in human 
likeness (Phlp 2:5), the Other made text, or the Christ-Ereignis 
as an inner-textual event. I will argue for a Christology or the 
Christ-Ereignis.3
Postfoundational practical theology 
as Christology
If one is always already in the text, and therefore theology 
will always already have started, then the theologian today 
comes to that which has already begun only to witness the 
Christ-Ereignis within and between texts in their contexts. 
The place to ‘start’ is where one already is, in a particular 
Dasein  of  a  particular  silent  speaking  of  language  where 
one seeks to understand an experience or practice or action 
(text) within its infinite referential chain of texts forming the 
contexts.
This  focus  on  Christ  is  certainly  easier  said  than  done  as 
there  are  so  many  different  interpretations  of  Jesus.  The 
New  Testament  alone  contains  at  least  four  versions  of 
Jesus. One would have missed the whole point if one sought 
to identify a particular image (construction) of Jesus as the 
symbol or sign of God. The Carmen Christi (Phlp 2:5–11) 
points one in a different direction of understanding Jesus as 
the One. He is the One, as he is the one who did not seek 
equality with God, but emptied himself of all divine content 
(Transcendent content). He did not seek to be a true and 
correct  presentation  of  the  Other,  but  emptied  himself  of 
all ambition to be just that, as there was no content of the 
Other in him. He was an empty symbol of the Other. Ray 
Brassier’s (2001:273) concept of a radical-hyle in response to 
3.I specifically use the German term ‘Ereignis’ to link it to Heidegger’s (1971) thinking 
of the Ereignis as a disclosing appropriation, as Hofstadter (1971:xxi) translates it. 
Laruelle’s non-philosophy might help in understanding this 
kenosis of all Other (divine) or Transcendent content. The 
radical-hyle  ‘enacts  matter’s  transcendental  foreclosure  to 
thought within thought’ (Brassier 2001:10). The radical-hyle 
enacts the other’s foreclosure to thought within thought. A 
radical-hyle is a non-conceptual symbol, in other words it 
is not an empirical conceptualisation of matter (the other) 
nor  a  transcendental  materialisation  of  the  concept  (see 
Brassier 2001:273). If anything it is an axiomatic heresy (see 
Brassier 2003). An axiomatic heresy that can be embraced in 
faith alone as a gift (grace alone), without any philosophy of 
correlation or philosophy of difference (see Laruelle 2010) to 
substantiate it and thus text (inScription) alone and nothing 
outside of text. Jesus, interpreted as radical-hyle, as a non-
conceptual symbol, as an axiomatic heresy that can only be 
embraced in faith and as a gift. If Christ is interpreted in 
such  postmetaphysical  metaphors  as  a  radical-hyle  and/
or  axiomatic  heresy,  then  one  can  speak  of  a  Christology 
or science of Christ (see Laruelle 2008) as a non-philosophy 
philosophy  or  non-religion  religion:  a  Christology,  where 
the  logos  has  been  crossed  out,  crucified  (see  Meylahn 
2013b:318f.). 
The  Christ-Ereignis  is  made  up  of  three  movements 
(incarnation  –  crucifixion  –  resurrection  and  ascension). 
These  three  movements  will  be  read  together  with  the 
five dance movements developed in Church emerging from 
the cracks (Meylahn 2012:53ff.) in an attempt to develop a 
postfoundational practical theology as public Christology. 
Practical  theologians,  as  Müller  argues,  begin  their  task 
by  describing  their  context  or  the  context  in  which  they 
are  working.  Practical  theologians  seek  to  understand 
the  various  texts  within  their  contexts  (archi-writing)  as 
the  silent  speaking  of  language  of  this  particular  Dasein. 
Yet,  following  the  challenge  of  Philippians  2:5,  they  find 
themselves  in  this  context  with  the  same  mind  as  Christ. 
The practical theologian, having the same mind as Christ, 
is emptied of divine content (content of the Other). They do 
not seek the truth of the context, because all they will find is 
their own truth reflected back to them, but they will seek to 
understand how these texts in context are unconcealed to them 
(received in their context) in a realm of the concealment (the 
silent speaking of the language of the context) and of their 
concealment (the silent speaking of their language). Thus, in 
following Christ one finds oneself incarnated, embodied in a 
particular Dasein, as one seeks to understand and interpret 
the embodied experiences of others in the silent speaking of 
their language through one’s own embodiment in the silent 
speaking of one’s language. The task of doing theology in 
this first moment of the Christ-Ereignis is the first two steps 
of  the  five  dance  movements,  which  is  to  listen4  and  to 
interpret5 (see Meylahn 2013b:53). In other words, two world-
4.Listening  (double  listening):  listen  to  the  dominant  common  language  of  the 
particular  context;  listen  to  the  shadow  stories  that  are  suppressed,  excluded, 
ignored and marginalised, but question the dominant common language of the 
particular context.
5.Interpreting: the particular stories (texts) need to be read within their contexts. To 
read the various particular texts within their contexts can only be done with the 
help of other disciplines and thus this is an interdisciplinary approach. Part of the 
narrative setting (contexts) of the particular stories (texts) is the sacred story or the 
story of ultimate reference which binds (regilare) into a particular community. This 
sacred story (religion) needs to be read and interpreted.Original Research
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creations meet each other and, in that meeting, there is a new 
world-creation (poiesis): the world-creation of the practical 
theologian and the world-creation of the community and the 
new world-creation of the fusion of horizons of these two. All 
these world-creations have dominant myths, sacred canopies 
or  Heidegger’s  divinities  of  the  Geviert.  The  theologian’s 
task,  as  theologian,  is  to  identify  these  gods  (divinities), 
dominant  myths  (ultimate  references),  that  present  these 
world-creations as God-given or natural, that is, as absolute: 
as the way things are or should be – the dominant myths that 
provide  the  ultimate  legitimisation  and  norms  to  present 
the  world  as  is,  with  its  particular  ontology.  This  critical 
engagement  with  the  dominant  myths,  discovering  the 
gods  of  the  contexts,  is  the  third  movement:  discernment,6 
discerning the powers that be, recognising the religion as 
the founding and legitimising myth of each of these world-
creations, and that binds (religare) this world together into 
a whole. The focus of this approach is on the religious of 
various life-worlds or on the religion of lived-religion. 
The critical discernment is not on the basis of having eaten 
of the tree of knowledge of good and evil and thus being 
in  a  superior  position  to  judge  the  various  gods  on  the 
basis of some or other sacred text (historical theology) or 
sacred  idea  (systematic  theology)  or  foundation,  but  is 
rather a humble recognition that each context, even one’s 
own context of critical discernment, has its gods. The result 
could  be  interpreted  as  frustrating  as  one  would  be  left 
with numerous world-creations, each with their gods and 
without a hyper-perspective or transcendent position from 
which to judge, as each of these contexts with their divinities 
is equally valid. Now, one could follow Browning (1991:71) 
who developed, in conversation with Habermas (1984, 1996), 
five universally acceptable validity claims whereby to judge 
certain  world-creations.  Church  emerging  from  the  cracks 
(Meylahn 2012) presents an alternative route to Browning 
and follows Christ’s bias for the least of the brothers and 
sisters,  to  recognise  the  marginalised  and  ostracised  and 
become  neighbour  (see  Meylahn  2009)  to  them  within  a 
particular Dasein of a particular world-creation. That is, to 
seek  the  shadow  stories  of  that  world-creation,  conscious 
that the choice of shadow stories is one’s choice determined 
by  one’s  own  world-creation  with  its  particular  divinity: 
legitimising  myth.  For  example,  a  feminist  would  choose 
the marginal voices of women and a Marxist would choose 
the marginal voices of the exploited workers and this choice 
would be determined by their Marxist or feminist worldview 
with their respective divinities (founding myths). There is 
no ‘correct’ choice of marginal voices as each choice creates 
its  own marginal  voices and therefore  keeps  the  practical 
theologian following Christ humble. 
 
The  chosen  marginal  voices  or  shadow  stories  haunt  the 
dominant  myths,  as  these  shadows  stories  question  the 
validity of the dominant myths. The very existence of the 
6.Discerning: the sacred story needs to be discerned as ultimate myths or ideology, 
not  judged  from  an  outside  (God’s  view),  nor  by  comparing  them  to  a  higher 
authority or higher myth, but from within the intertextual context. These ultimate 
myths as totalising myths have many victims – marginalised and ostracised shadow 
stories (texts) that question the ultimate authority of these sacred texts. 
shadow stories questions the ontology of the world-creation, 
as according to the norm these shadow stories should not 
exist, yet they do and thus their very existence question the 
ontology and, by questioning the ontology, they question the 
legitimising and authoritative myth of that specific ontology. 
The shadow stories (marginal or ostracised voices) by their 
very  non-existence  existence  unbind  the  binding  force  of 
religion. Jesus’ becoming neighbour (see Meylahn 2009) to 
these shadow stories blasphemes (questions the authority) the 
dominant myths and thus the powers that be had to destroy 
this ultimate criminal who challenged both their ontology as 
well as their founding myth (god). He is the ultimate criminal 
because he threatens, by loving the unloveable and accepting 
the unacceptable, to unbind their whole world as this love 
and acceptance threatens to untie their world from the sun or 
murder their gods (see Nietzsche 1974:181–182). The powers 
that be reacted to this challenge by crucifying Christ (1 Cor 2:8) 
as a blasphemer, as one who challenged the founding and 
legitimising myths. The blasphemy is not the cross, but the 
incarnation  and  ministry.  The  cross  is  the  blasphemy  of 
blasphemy  and  thus  the  utter  forsakenness  by  God.  One 
could argue that God (the divine) died in the incarnation 
and that the crucifixion is the death of the death of God (see 
Meylahn 2013b:316f.). In other words, the crucifixion is the 
death of the certainty of atheism which does not translate into 
theism, but the utter uncertainty, of being utterly forsaken of 
any foundation, even the foundation of the way of Christ, 
and therefore the logos of Christ is crucified: Christology (see 
Meylahn 2013b:316ff.). But in that crucifixion is the birth of 
the impossible possible: resurrected life. 
Practical theologians, by seeking to have the same mind as 
Christ, open themselves to the marginal and thereby open 
themselves to being labelled blasphemers as they challenge, 
by their association with the least of the brothers and sisters, 
the dominant legitimising myth. They challenge and thus 
blaspheme  the  gods  of  the  various  world-creations  by 
becoming  neighbours  to  the  shadow  stories.  This  fourth 
movement  is  described  as  re-interpreting  or  re-authoring7 
(poeisis or poetics of the kingdom) the particular stories of 
the context by an intertextual reading between the stories of 
the context with the stories of Christ and witnessing how the 
shadow stories challenge the dominant myths and reading 
that in light of Christ’s incarnation and ministry. The Gospel 
of Jesus is interpreted as an exemplary narrative of that which 
happens in texts (deconstruction because of différance)8 (see 
Meylahn 2013b:310f.). Following Christ into the incarnation 
7.Re-authoring  (poiesis):  the  movement  of  re-authoring  already  begins  with  the 
previous movement of discernment. This movement is the re-reading of the texts 
within their contexts in the light or intertextual reading with the story of Christ, as 
the story of the world.
8.Why  can  one  translate  the  Christ-Ereignis  into  the  post-metaphysical  metaphor 
and imagination of différance? Has a new truth been found? Has the ‘correct’ 
interpretation of Christ been found? No, I could not have done otherwise as the 
letter arrives at its destination. Can the West think beyond Athens and Jerusalem, or 
will Athens and Jerusalem always be part of thinking from a Western perspective? 
The Bible and the writings of the Greeks are part of the West’s mythology. They 
form part of the West’s narrative resources and thus imaginings. Postmetaphysics 
developed out of this fertile ground and thus the imaginings of postmetaphysics 
are within the metaphors of both Athens and Jerusalem, amongst others. There 
is no outside text and therefore there are no imaginations outside the texts of the 
West for somebody whose context is influenced by the West. Could it have been 
otherwise – that these two inter-texts translate into each other? Perhaps, as the 
letter does and possibly does not arrive at its destination, as it is haunted by a 
Christology or différance.Original Research
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and crucifixion by becoming neighbour to the shadow stories, 
the  practical  theologian  witnesses  the  auto-deconstruction  of 
the gods. The theologian does not deconstruct (on whose or 
which authority would he or she do that?), but the theologian 
is a witness to the auto-deconstruction that happens once he 
or she becomes neighbour to the shadow stories. In that auto-
deconstructed space something new can arise: resurrection. 
A  new  community,  liberated  from  the  dominant  norms, 
legitimised  by  the  dominant  myths,  and  therefore  a 
community where there is neither Jew nor Greek, man or 
woman, free or slave (Gl 3:28) or any other categorisation by 
which ontological place is given to things within a particular 
world, legitimised and authorised by a particular myth. 
This  new  community  is  not  the  answer,  because  in  its 
resurrection  and  its  understanding  of  itself  as  a  new 
community it creates a new sacred canopy. The moment the 
new community is conscious of itself as new community and 
bound together (religare) as a community it will have formed 
its own authorising and legitimising myth, which excludes 
and creates shadow stories.
One  of  the  last  thoughts  Nietzsche  penned  down  to  his 
friend Georg during the final stages of his illness, as quoted 
by Heidegger: ‘After you had discovered me, it was no trick 
to find me: the difficulty now is to lose me … (signed) The 
Crucified’  (Heidegger  1968:53).  Once  the  community  has 
found Christ as its liberating source, it needs to lose Christ 
before Christ becomes an ideology. Thus, the Christological 
community is a community that can never be, but is always 
still  to  come.  It  is  a  community  that  is  dependent  on  the 
gift (sola gratia) of the Christ-Ereignis (sola Christus) that is 
witnessed and received in faith (sola fide), through becoming 
neighbour  to  the  shadow  stories  whereby  the  dominant 
myths are auto-deconstructed as an inner textual event (sola 
scriptura). Carl Schmitt (1976) argues that the loss of enemies 
is the death of the political. The Christ-Ereignis is the death of 
the political as such, because no community can be formed 
in this continuous challenge to love enemies. It is the death 
of theory (logos) as well, because any theory is continuously 
deconstructed by that which the theory excludes or does not 
say and therefore it is the death of logos. But logos cannot 
die just as little as metaphysics can die, but it can be thought 
through and thus be wounded – always open to the future 
(see Laruelle 2003:181) and therefore a crucified logos.
 
The last dance movement develops this idea of the community 
always to come in its embracing listening.9 The new needs to 
be embraced, but very conscious that in that embrace new 
margins are created and in those margins and cracks of the 
resurrected community are shadow stories that need to be 
listened to. The new community is embraced, but conscious 
that it needs to already begin to listen to the shadow stories 
of its own creation and therefore it remains a community 
to come. The new community can never be, but is always 
to  come  and  thus  it  is  a  community  that  is  continuously 
9.Embracing – listening: a dance without end in the time that remains. New life-
giving words are poetically formed and unique outcomes are discovered that can 
be embraced. These unique outcomes are not the final story, but they need to be 
listened to, discerned and re-authored in the time that remains. 
reforming (ecclesia reformata), not by human will or power, 
but  by  what  is  happening  in  the  texts  of  the  community 
where the church or the theologian finds herself (verbum Dei). 
 
A working description for 
postfoundational practical theology 
I would like to propose a working description for practical 
theology  as  public  Christology.  Practical  theology  is  to 
witness in love, to bear testimony in faith and to receive the 
Christ-Ereignis in grace as an inner-textual and intertextual 
event in reading texts within their contexts and embracing 
the space of hope that such double reading creates to continue 
reading in the time that remains.
This proposed description of practical theology is a way of 
reading, but a way is still too strong a concept as it reminds 
one of a praxis (theory-laden practice) which functions on the 
basis of certain foundational knowledge which guides and 
determines the way (practice) as its theory. Thus, I would 
not opt for Edmund Arens’ (1992) concept of Christo-praxis, 
which he develops in conversation with Habermas’ (1984) 
communicative action, as that would be too strong a term 
to  use.  Christo-praxis  would  be  guided  by  the  theory  of 
communicative action. 
Instead of a way it is more a Gelassenheit or spirituality of love 
reaching out and an expectant hope to witness the Christ-
Ereignis which disclosingly appropriates a new community 
without  disclosing  anything  and  without  being  able  to 
appropriate  anything  but  hope,  faith,  grace  and  Christ, 
in  text,  through  love  alone.  It  is  a  spirituality  of  reading 
with a particular hermeneutic of love for marginal stories. 
The hermeneutic of love for marginal stories is inspired by 
hope expecting to witness the Christ-Ereignis and through 
faith to give testimony to that Ereignis in an inner-textual 
and  intertextual  reading.  An  intertextual  reading  where 
the  Christ-narratives  are  read  together  with  the  auto-
deconstruction that happens in texts when one finds oneself 
neighbour to the marginal and shadow stories in the texts. 
This reading together is a theo-poetics,10 or rather a Christo-
poetics,  where  what  happens  in  texts  is  interpreted  with 
the  help  of  the  Christ-narratives  so  that  one  can  witness 
and give testimony to the Christ-Ereignis as Christo-poetics. 
Christo-poetics is a poiesis and in that sense a construction, 
but also not a construction as it lacks the foundations of a 
construction,  lacks  order  and  completion  of  constructions 
and thus it is, if anything, a vulnerable temporary creation 
(poiesis): Christo-poetics that is vulnerable and wounded, like 
the lamb that was slain that enters the throne room to unlock 
the seven seals of history (Rv 5:6). 
This spirituality, or Gelassenheit, is reading texts where one 
finds oneself neighbour to the shadow stories and witnesses 
10.What is important for theo-poetics and which prevents it from becoming theo-
poetry and eventually theo-politcs is that theo-poetics does not have an author, 
there is no conclusive meaning, there is no order, but always complexity, and 
there is no end, but openness to what is still to come (see Meylahn 2013b:301ff.). 
Thus, although theo-poetics is a kind of social-construction (a poiesis), there is 
an important difference in the four characteristics of theo-poetics: no author, no 
conclusive meaning, no order but complexity, and no end but openness to what 
is still to come.Original Research
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the  blasphemy  of  the  dominant  myths,  and  therefore  the 
crucifixion, and interprets this happening through a Christo-
poetics by an intertextual reading of the Christ-Ereignis with 
the auto-deconstruction that happens in all texts because of 
différance. Although such a reading is a temporary vulnerable 
poiesis, it is also a fragile universalism, as it is a witnessing of 
auto-deconstruction as something that happens in all texts 
because of différance. Thus, this spirituality of reading is a 
reading of all texts and therefore it is a public spirituality 
as it is a spiritual reading of public texts, it is an academic 
spirituality as it is a spirituality of reading academic texts 
and a church spirituality as it is a spirituality of reading the 
texts  of  the  denominational  traditions.  A  Christology  is  a 
spiritual sense of not-being11 because of love’s call to become 
neighbour to the marginal voices in reading the texts in all 
three of Tracy’s (1981:3–31) publics: academia, public and 
church. The theologian becomes neighbour to the marginal 
voices  and  therefore  shares  the  non-being  status  of  the 
marginal voices to reduce to nothing the dominant discourses 
of these three publics and, engaging the texts of these publics 
with a love for what is not said, becomes neighbour to those 
marginal voices in the dominant discourses with a sense of 
expectancy for the Christ-Ereignis. Christology is not at home 
in any of these publics. As it is spirituality of non-being it 
does not have a home, like the son of man who does not 
have a place to lay his head (Mt 8:20). Thus Christology is, 
if anything, disruptive in the three publics. It is not a logos 
and thus, if anything, it is a folly (1 Cor 1:27) to put to shame 
the wisdom of the world – the wisdom that binds (religare) 
these publics into an identifiable entity. But it is not a folly 
in  the  sense  of  a  morosophia  (see  Meylahn  2013b:325ff.; 
Phan 2001) but, if anything, rather in the sense of the salos 
(Byzantine  Holy  Fools  of  late  antiquity  and  early  Middle 
Ages) whose openness to the Other allowed their continuous 
self-deconstruction (see Meylahn 2013b:331). Yet, its fragile 
universal practicality cannot be denied in all three publics, 
because by becoming neighbour to the marginal and shadow 
stories,  and  by  becoming  neighbour  witnessing  the  auto-
deconstruction of dominant societal, academic and church 
discourses, they are opened up for democracy and justice 
always  still  to  come,  Derrida  (2005:78–94)  would  argue. 
Thus, by being a spirituality of non-being it has no home and 
yet its homelessness and folly plays an important role in the 
various discourses as it opens these discourses for the future 
still to come and thus it is a discourse of the future – future 
being its only home: the kingdom to come. 
The church or the community of a 
postfoundational practical theology
Where does such a practical theology leave the church or the 
community of believers or the resurrected community that is 
always still to come? What kind of community is the ‘church’ 
11.There are enough references throughout the New Testament for the call to non-
being of the Christian. There is the call to be in the world, but not of the world (Jn 
17:14–15), as well as the call not to conform to the patterns of the world (Rm 12:2). 
In 1 Corinthians 1:28, God’s choice of those that are not to reduce to nothing things 
that are echoes – something of the call to auto-deconstruction through becoming 
neighbour to those who are not so as to reduce to nothing those that are (the 
dominant discourses). Even more radical are Jesus’ calls to become nothing (death) 
for the other as a call to discipleship in John 15:13. In Matthew 16:24, there is the 
call to deny yourself and pick up the cross to become a disciple. 
that is always still to come and yet, because of its spirituality 
of love, it witnesses and gives testimony to the disruption 
(putting to shame and bringing to nothing) of the dominant 
discourses in the various publics? Does this witnessing and 
testimony fulfil the criteria for communicative action? Does 
action not require there to be a purposeful intentional subject 
who can be held responsible for the action? From the above 
description, the theologian would have as his or her main 
‘action’ to read with a spirituality of love and through love 
witness  and  give  testimony  to  the  Christ-Ereignis.  Could 
the theology then be described, in reference to Habermas 
(1984, 1996), as communicative action and the church as a 
community of communicative action? 
Habermas’s theory takes the linguistic turn seriously and yet 
seeks to develop a grand theory of normativity and validity 
and thus finds himself a defender of modernity rather than 
an  advocate  of  postmodernity.  It  is  probably  this  defence 
of normativity and validity that makes him an interesting 
conversational partner for practical theology (see Arens 1992; 
Browning  1991;  Heitink  1999;  Peukert  1984;  Van  der  Ven 
2004). Robert Mager (2012:258) argues that it is the theory of 
action which is both descriptive (analytical) and prescriptive 
(normative)  which  attracted  practical  theologians.  The 
analytical (descriptive) side of action theory helped theology 
to gain acceptability within the academic public as a serious 
analytical  modern  science  and  the  prescriptive  helped 
practical theology to remain true to God (God’s gift or plan 
or law) (see Mager 2012:258). 
Does  practical  theology  have  to  gain  acceptability  in  the 
university (as the place for academic discourse) or should 
it  be  disruptive  of  these  discourses,  in  other  words,  play 
the jester in the academic discourses rather than theology’s 
previous  role  as  queen  of  the  sciences?  Should  practical 
theology  be  prescriptive?  The  above  working  description 
interprets a practical theology as Christology that does not 
seek acceptance in academic discourse, but is disruptive; nor 
does it seek to be prescriptive and yet it witnesses continuous 
transformation. 
In action theory, specifically communicative action theory, 
to be the subject of action one has to be and have intentions 
that  can  be  justified  via  universally  valid  claims.12  Yet 
God has chosen what is not (non-subjects), to shame what 
is  (1  Cor  1:28).  Thus  the  chosen,  the  elect,  are  not  (non-
subjects)  for  a  specific  purpose:  to  shame  what  is.  In  the 
testimony  of  the  Christ-Ereignis,  the  theologian  (church) 
does  not  utter  something  understandable,  but  something 
disruptive, challenging the ontology and the metaphysics of 
that particular world (public). As Heidegger argues, truth, 
rightness and truthfulness – if it is understood as correlation 
or  adequate  representation  of  something  (facts;  norms 
for  interpersonal  relationship  or  a  speaker’s  subjectivity) 
12.The validity claims: ‘1. uttering something understandably;
                                      2. giving [the hearer] something to understand;
                                      3. making himself thereby understandable; and 
                                        4. coming to an understanding with another person’ (Habermas
                                             1996:119). 
     Later, Habermas (1996:131) develops these claims within three different domains 
and  in  each  domain  of  reality  there  is  the  appropriate  claim  to  either  truth, 
rightness or truthfulness using different modes of communication.Original Research
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–  forgets  that  aletheia  is  always  an  unconcealing  in 
concealment (see Heidegger 1984:§§24–24). Thus, questions 
of  truth,  rightness  and  truthfulness  are  dependent  on  the 
Gesichtskreis of unconcealment and the dominant discourses 
within  that  Gesichtskreis.  These  dominant  discourses  will 
determine  the  legitimising  myth,  the  norms  and  thus  the 
ontology according to which the truth is measured and so 
the dominant discourse will always find its truth, rightness 
and truthfulness reflected back at it in the various publics 
(domains).  As  Lacan  (1972)  argues,  in  references  to  Poe’s 
Purloined Letter, the letter always arrives at its destination, or 
as mentioned in the beginning, the theologian will find his or 
her truth, rightness, truthfulness reflected back at himself or 
herself. Derrida (1975:107) challenged Lacan’s interpretation, 
arguing  that  the  letter  might  and  might  not  arrive  at  its 
destination. It is this ‘might not arrive at its destination’ that 
inspires the Christological approach to seek not to be a valid 
discourse in Tracy’s three publics or the three domains of 
Habermas, but rather to be a disruptive discourse in these 
publics and domains. A public Christology does not give that 
particular  public  something  to  understand,  but  questions 
that public by opening it for what it excludes. It does not 
make itself understandable, but becomes nothing, even to the 
point of death, to challenge what is. It does not come to an 
understanding, but creates space for new understanding. And 
yet, in the Christo-poetics of testimony, there is something 
sensible  (understandable)  which  is  communicated  that  is 
liberating: the hearers do receive the good news, the Christ-
Ereignis is made understandable and a new community of 
temporary fragile understanding is created. It is a message 
that is communicated and understood in the witnessing of 
the subversion of the dominant, acceptable and normative 
discourses, not with a better foundational discourse, but with 
what is to come: the future. 
 
Edmund Arens (1994:34), in conversation with Habermas, 
seeks to understand the communicative action of the church, 
her  Christo-praxis,  according  to  five  characteristics:  inter-
subjective,  propositional-performative,  textual,  contextual 
and  it  has  an  intentional  character.  How  would  Christo-
poetics differ from such a Christo-praxis? The Christological 
spirituality  of  non-being  would  agree  with  it  being  inter-
subjective,  textual  and  contextual.  The  problem  is  with 
propositional-performative and intentionality. 
Does the Gelassene reading, which is a spirituality of love, 
have a propositional-performative character? Propositional 
from the Latin, prōpositiō, means to set out in words. Christo-
poetics sets out in words, but the difference is that it is not 
the subject (author) that sets out in words something that 
the  words  refer  to  (that  can  be  validated  as  objectively 
truthful, right according to the dominant norms, or truthful 
of a specific subject), but the subject finds himself or herself 
set out in words, in text (language) and, in that text, he or 
she witnesses the Christ-Ereginis, as a disruption of norms 
of rightness and a disruption of identity and character. The 
action has to have a propositional-performative character, in 
other words it does not only seek to set out in words, but it 
seeks to change the reality it sets out in words. In the above 
paragraphs, it was made clear that Christo-poetics changes 
the reality as it opens reality for what is still to come. The 
question  is:  who  is  the  author  of  this  change?  Or  stated 
differently,  who  is  the  subject  of  this  performance?  The 
theologian of the Christology is witness of the Christ-Ereignis 
and not the author thereof. Thus the subject of the ‘action’ 
in this communicative action theory of Habermas is not the 
practical theologian or the church, but he or she is only the 
witness thereof and testifies to what has been witnessed via 
Christo-poetics. The subject of that action is the grammatical 
structure and incompleteness of language itself (God as the 
infinite  desertification  of  language),  which  is  interpreted 
with the help of the Christ-Ereignis. 
The intentional character of this spirituality would be love 
for  the  marginal,  but  again  it  is  not  an  active  choice  of 
deciding who my neighbour is, but rather a passive finding 
oneself in the position of being a neighbour to the marginal 
and shadow stories of the dominant discourses one happens 
to be part of. In the parable of the Good Samaritan, Jesus 
turns the question around from who is my neighbour, where 
the I is the subject of choice, to who was neighbour to this 
person  (see  Lk  10:25–37),  where  the  I  (subject)  passively 
finds himself or herself being neighbour to the one in need. 
The intentionality is love and through love finding oneself 
neighbour  to  the  marginal  and  there,  in  that  non-place 
amongst the non-beings hoping to receive the gift (grace) 
of the Christ-Ereignis in the text alone and to give testimony 
to what one has witnessed. This Gelassene reading through 
a spirituality of love, although it is not completely passive, 
certainly cannot be described as a performative action of an 
intentional subject who is in control and motivated with clear 
deontological or teleological foundational reasons for his or 
her  actions,  but  can  rather  be  described  as  a  receptive  or 
Gelassene openness to the Christ-Ereignis in the desire to have 
the same mind as Christ. The local church can therefore not 
have an intentional performative action plan, but in seeking 
to have the same mind as Christ it is open to witness the 
Christ-Ereignis and give testimony thereof. 
Arens  (1994:42ff.)  argues  that  it  is  not  only  a  matter  of 
witnessing  and  giving  testimony  (Bezeugen),  but  also  to 
confess (Bekennen), and it is in the confession that the church’s 
action  is  communicated  as  an  understandable  utterance 
where something is understood, thereby making the church 
understandable  and  coming  to  a  common  understanding 
with others. The interesting thing about the word Bekennen 
is  that  it  contains  the  word  kennen  (to  know).  What  does 
Christological  spirituality  know?  It  knows  nothing,  but 
Christ crucified, therefore it knows nothing that is certain, 
fixed, foundational or conclusive, not even the certainty of 
uncertainty, and yet it can confess this lack of knowledge and 
its utter dependence on faith, grace, Christ and text alone. Is 
this confession of the four soli enough to create and sustain a 
community of praxis? No, it is not, but nor should it be, as the 
resurrected community can never be created nor sustained, 
as it is a community that is always still to come. Therefore the Original Research
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confession (Bekennen) of such a Christology is, if anything, 
a  confession  of  non-being  and  the  utter  dependence  on 
the four soli and a confession of being called to become an 
always reforming church that never makes complete sense 
in this world as it is a church in, but not of the world. It is 
ecclesia reformata, semper reformanda secundum verbum Dei. The 
church as such cannot exist because to love enemies, as Carl 
Schmitt (1976) tells us, is the end of the political, thus the 
church, called to love enemies, called to become neighbour 
to the least of the brothers and sisters, can never be church, 
but if anything only be a becoming church in the time that 
remains. It is a church of the future as the future is her home. 
Conclusion
Postfoundational, not in the sense of non-foundations, but in 
the sense of thinking through foundations, like Heidegger’s 
postmetaphysics,  was  a  wounding  of  metaphysics  (see 
Heidegger  2003;  Meylahn  2013b:18f.),  or  Derrida’s 
postmetaphysics was the closure, not end, of metaphysics 
(see Derrida 1997:4; Meylahn 2013b:194ff.). Postfoundational 
practical  theology  is  thinking  through  the  foundations, 
religion,  or  metaphysics  of  the  various  life-worlds  and 
witnessing  their  wounds  or  crucifixion  because  of  what 
they invariable exclude and therefore their opening for the 
future.  It  is  a  witnessing  not  on  a  basis  of  a  foundation, 
but on what ‘God does in language or history’ (God as the 
infinite  desertification  of  language)  as  revealed  in  Christ, 
thus opening the life-world for what is to come: the kingdom 
to come. 
The postfoundational practical theologian is called to a public 
Christological  spirituality  of  not-being,  through  becoming 
neighbour to the marginal voices in the texts of the various 
publics  (academia,  society  and  church)  and  there  bear 
witness and in faith offer testimony to the Christ-Ereignis, as 
he or she in hope continues reading texts in contexts in the 
time that remains. 
Acknowledgements
Competing interests 
The  author  declares  that  he  has  no  financial  or  personal 
relationships that may have inappropriately influenced him 
in writing this article.
References
Arens, E., 1992, Christopraxis: Grundzuge theologischer Handlungstheorie, Herder, 
Freiburg. PMCid:PMC50315
Arens, E., 1994, ‘Leitlinien einer handlungstheoretischen Christologie‘, in E. Arens 
(ed.), Gottesrede Glaubenspraxis: Perspecktiven Theologischer Handlungstheorie, 
pp. 29–48, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt. 
Benjamin, W., 1996, ‘Critique of violence’, in M. Bullock & M.W. Jennings (eds.), Walter 
Benjamin: Selected Writings, Vol 1: 1913–1926, pp. 236–252, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge.
Berger, P., 1967, The sacred canopy: Elements of a sociological theory of religion, 
Anchor Books, New York.
Brassier, R., 2001, ‘Alien theory: The decline of materialism in the name of matter’, 
PhD thesis, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick. 
Brassier, R., 2003, ‘Axiomatic heresy: The non-philosophy of François Laruelle’, Radical 
Philosophy 121, 24−35.
Browning, D.S., 1991, A fundamental practical theology: Descriptive and strategic 
proposals, Fortress Press, Minneapolis. 
Caputo, J.D., 2006, The weakness of God: A theology of the event, Indiana University 
Press, Indianapolis. 
Crites, S., 1989, ‘The narrative quality of experience’, in S. Haerwas & L.G. Jones (eds.), 
Why narrative? Readings in narrative theology, W.M.B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids. 
Derrida, J., 1975, ‘The purveyor of truth’, transl. W. Domingo, J. Hulbert & M. Ron, Yale 
French Studies – Graphesis: Perspectives in literature and philosophy 52, 31–113.
Derrida, J., 1995, ‘Sauf le nom’, in J. Derrida & T. Dutoit (eds.), On the name, pp. 35–88, 
transl. D. Wood, J.J. Leavey & I. McLeod, Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
Derrida, J., 1997, Of grammatology, transl. G.C. Spivak, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
Derrida, J., 2002, ‘Faith and knowledge: The two sources of “religion” at the limits of 
reason alone’, in G. Anidjar (ed.), Acts of religion, pp. 40–101, transl. J.F. Graham, 
Routledge, London. 
Derrida, J., 2005, ‘The last of the rogue states: The “democracy to come”, opening in 
two turns’, transl. R.-A. Brault & M. Naas (eds.), Rogues: Two essays on reason, pp. 
78–94, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Derrida,  J.,  2008,  ‘How  to  avoid  speaking:  Denials’,  in  P.  Kamuf  &  E.  Rottenberg 
(eds.), Psyche: Inventions of the Other, vol. II, pp. 143–195, transl. K. Frieden & E. 
Rottenberg, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Failing, W.-E. & Heimbrock, H.-G., 1998, Gelebte Religion Wahrnehmen. Lebenswelt – 
Altagskultur- Religionspraxis, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart. 
Ganzevoort, R., 2009, ‘Forks in the Road when tracing the sacred: Practical theology 
as hermeneutics of lived religion’, Presidential address to the 9th conference of 
the IAPT in Chicago, 30 July – 03 August, viewed 20 May 2013, from http://www.
ruardganzevoort.nl/pdf/2009_Presidential.pdf
Geertz, C., 1993, ‘Religion as a cultural system’, in C. Geertz (ed.), The interpretation of 
cultures: Selected essays, pp. 87–125, Fontana Press, Waukegan. 
Gräb,  W.,  2002,  Sinn  furs  Unendliche:  Religion  in  der  Mediengesellschaft,  Kaiser, 
Gütersloh. 
Habermas,  J.,  1984,  The  theory  of  communicative  action  1.  Reason  and  the 
rationalization of society, Polity Press, Cambridge.
Habermas,  J.,  1996,  ‘What  is  universal  pragmatics?’,  in  W.  Outhwaite  (ed.),  The 
Habermas reader, pp. 118–131, Polity Press, Cambridge.
Heidegger, M., 1968, What is called thinking?, transl. F.D. Wieck & J.G. Gray, Harper & 
Row Publishers, London. 
Heidegger, M., 1971, Poetry, language, thought, transl. A. Hofstadter, Harper & Row, 
New York.
Heidegger, M., 1984, ‘Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte ”Probleme” der 
Logik’, in F.-W. von Herrmann (ed.), Gesamtausgabe, B. 45, Klostermann, Frankfurt.
Heidegger, M., 2003, ‘Overcoming metaphysics’, transl. J. Stambaugh (ed.), Martin 
Heidegger: The end of philosophy, pp. 84–110, University of Chicago, Chicago.
Heitink, G., 1999, Practical theology: History, theory, action domains: Manual for 
practical theology, transl. R. Bruinsma, W.M.B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids. 
Hofstadter, A., 1971, ‘Introduction’, in M. Heidegger (ed.), Poetry, language, thought, 
pp. ix–xxii, Harper & Row, New York. 
Kearney, R., 2001, The God who may be: A hermeneutics of religion, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington. 
Lacan, J., 1972, ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”’, transl. J. Mehlman, Yale French 
Studies – French Freud: Structural Studies in Psychoanalysis 48, 39–72. 
Laruelle,  F.,  1999,  ‘A  summary  of  non-philosophy’,  Pli:  The  Warwick  Journal  of 
Philosophy 8, 138–148.
Laruelle,  F.,  2000,  ‘Identity  and  event’,  Pli:  The  Warwick  Journal  of  Philosophy  – 
Parallel Processes 9, 174−189. 
Laruelle,  F.,  2003,  ‘What  can  non-philosophy  do?’,  transl.  R.  Brassier,  Angelaki: 
Journal  of  the  Theoretical  Humanities  8(2),  169–189.  http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/0969725032000162648
Laruelle, F., 2008, ‘A Science of Christ’, paper presented at the Grandeur of Reason: 
Religion, tradition and universalism conference in Rome, 01–04 September.
Laruelle, F., 2010, Philosophies of difference: A critical introduction to non-philosophy, 
transl. R. Gangle, Continuum, New York, Kindle edition. 
Louw, D.J., 2011, ‘Ta splanchna: A theopaschitic approach to a hermeneutics of God’s 
praxis. From zombie categories to passion categories in the theory formation for 
a practical theology of the intestines’, HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 
67(3). http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/hts.v67i3.1087
Luther, M., 1518, ‘The Heidelberg disputation’, in The book of concord: Confessions 
of the Lutheran Church, viewed 31 August 2011, from http://bookofconcord.org/
heidelberg.php
Mager, R., 2012, ‘Action theories’, in B.J. Miller-McLemore (ed.), The Wiley-Blackwell 
companion to practical theology, pp. 255–265, Blackwell Publishing , Oxford.
McBrien, R.P., 1987, Caesar’s coin, MacMillan Publishing Company, New York. 
Meylahn, J.A., 2009, ‘Responsibility, God and society: The cry of the Other in the 
sacred texts as a challenge towards responsible global citizenship’, HTS Teologiese 
Studies/Theological Studies 65(1). http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/hts.v65i1.131
Meylahn, J.A., 2012, Church emerging from the cracks: A church in, but not of the 
world, Sun Media, Bloemfontein. Original Research
doi:10.4102/ve.v35i2.875 http://www.ve.org.za
Page 11 of 11
Meylahn, J.A., 2013a, ‘The hidden potential of pre-theoretical transversal events or 
advents of a Rainbow Nation’, HTS Teologiese studies/Theological Studies 69(1). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/hts.v69i1.1305
Meylahn, J.A., 2013b, ‘The limits and possibilities of postmetaphysical God-talk: A 
conversation between Heidegger, Levinas and Derrida’, Studies in Philosophical 
Theology 52, Peeters, Leuven. 
Müller , J., 2004, ‘HIV/AIDS, narrative practical theology, and postfoundationalism: 
The  emergence  of  a  new  story’,  HTS  Theological  Studies/Teologiese  Studies 
60(1&2), 293–306. 
Müller, J., 2011, ‘Postfoundational practical theology for a time of transition’, HTS 
Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 67(1), Art. #837, 5 pages.
Neuhaus, R.J., 1984, The naked plublic square, W.M.B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids. 
Nietzsche, F., 1974, The gay science, transl. W. Kaufmann (ed.), Vintage, New York. 
Peukert, H., 1984, Science, action, and fundamental theology, transl. J. Bohman, MIT 
Press, Cambridge. 
Phan, P.C., 2001, ‘The wisdom of Holy Fools in Postmodernity’, Theological Studies 
62, 730–752.
Ricoeur, P., 1973, ‘The model of the text: Meaningful action considered as a text’, New 
Literary History – ‘What is literature?’ 5(1), 91–117. 
Schmitt, C., 1976, The concept of the political, transl. G. Schwab, Rutgers University 
Press, New Brunswick. 
Tillich, P., 1951, Systematic theology, vol. 1., University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Tracy, D., 1975, Blessed rage for order, Seabury Press, Minneapolis. PMCid:PMC432634
Tracy, D., 1981, The analogical imagination, Crossroad, New York. PMCid:PMC1249447
Van der Ven, J.A., 2004, ‘Towards a comparative empirical theology of mindful action’, 
in C.A.M. Hermans & M.E. Moore (eds.), Hermeneutics and empirical research in 
practical theology: The contribution of empirical theology by Johannes A. van der 
Ven, pp. 331–388, Brill, Leiden. 
Van Huyssteen, J.W., 1997, Essays in postfoundational theology, W.M.B. Eerdmans, 
Grand Rapids.
Van Huyssteen, J.W., 1998, Duet or duel? Theology and science in a postmodern world, 
Trinity Press International, Harrisburg. 